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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Ruben Gaytan appeals from his judgment of conviction for lewd conduct with a
minor under the age of sixteen. Mr. Gaytan pleaded guilty but preserved the right to
appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress. He asserts that the district court erred
by denying the motion because his seizure was not supported by reasonable suspicion
that he was engaged in criminal activity.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The following facts are taken from the district court's findings of fact on
Mr. Gaytan's motion to suppress. On November 12, 2011, a little after two o'clock in the
morning, Sergeant Chris Siems and another officer were patrolling a subdivision off
Linder Road and Cayuse Creek Drive, in Meridian, Idaho. (R., p.84.) Sergeant Siems
testified that he was patrolling in that area because there had been a lot of vandalism,
car burglaries, curfew violations, and other criminal activity, both in the subdivision and
in the subdivision park in particular.

(R., p.84.)

Driving by this park was part of his

regular patrol, and within the public purview of his patrol. (R., p.84.) Sergeant Siems
also testified that he had come upon people having sex in a vehicle before, which he
testified was illegal.

(R., p.85.)

He testified that the park had been targeted for

vandalism. (R., p.85.) As he was patrolling, he saw a white SUV parked in the parking
lot of the subdivision park. (R., p.85.)
As he approached the vehicle, about 50 feet away, he did not initially see anyone
in the SUV.

(R., p.85.)

Sergeant Siems shined his spotlight into the SUV, and he
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immediately saw two people pop up. (R., p.85.)

He testified that one was a male with

dark hair and a goatee, and the other, a female with long dark hair.

(R., p.85.)

Sergeant Siems testified that he could see that the male had no clothes on his upper
torso, because he could see him in the window to below his shoulder.

(R., p.85.)

Sergeant Siems testified that both individuals looked surprised, like they had gotten
caught doing something. (R., p.85.) As he testified, it was "like uh oh." (R., p.85.) At
that point, he activated his overhead lights and drove his patrol car closer to the parked
SUV. (R., p.85.) Sergeant Siems testified that he activated his lights to let the couple
know it was the police and not someone else. (R., p.85.)
As Sergeant Siems approached the SUV, he saw the male jump over the seat
which exposed the whole right side of his body and he could see that the male did not
have any clothing on at all. (R., p.85.) Sergeant Siems exited his vehicle and knocked
on the window to further investigate. (R., p.85.)
was also unclothed.

(R., p.85.)

As he did so, he noticed the female

Sergeant Siems knocked on the window and the

female opened the door. She was trying to cover herself.

(R., p.85.)

She looked

frightened. When asked how old she was, she replied that she was fourteen (14) years
old.

(R., p.85.) Sergeant Siems testified that the male was in the back of the SUV,

under a blanket moving around, and was not responsive to his commands. He did not
want to come out, even with the officer's commands. (R., p.85.) Finally, he did come
out and was very hostile.

(R., p.85.)

He did not want to cooperate, but finally told

Sergeant Siems he was the fourteen-year-old's father. (R., p.85.) The fourteen-year-old
confirmed that he was her father. (R., p.85.)
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Mr. Gaytan was charged with three counts of lewd conduct with a minor under
the age of sixteen

(R., p.20.) He filed a motion to suppress, asserting that he was

seized without reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal
activity. (R., p.46.) The district court denied the motion

(R., p.84.) Mr. Gaytan then

pleaded guilty to one count of lewd conduct, but preserved the right to appeal from the
denial of the motion to suppress.

(R., p.96.)

The district court imposed a unified

sentence of twenty-five years, with eight years fixed.

(R., p.108.) Mr. Gaytan timely

appealed. (R., p.114.) He asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to
suppress.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Gaytan's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Gaytan's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Gaytan asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress

because he was seized without reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was engaged
in criminal activity.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated." State v. Holland,

135 Idaho 159, 161 (2000). When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged,
the appellate court should, "accept the trial court's findings of fact which were supported
by substantial evidence, but freely review the application of constitutional principles to
the facts as found." Id. "Decisions regarding the credibility of witnesses, weight to be
given to conflicting evidence, and factual inferences to be drawn are also within the
discretion of the trial court." State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009).
C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Gaytan's Motion To Suppress
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right of

the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, as does Article I,
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; ID. CONST. art. I, § 17;
State v. Alexander, 138 Idaho 18, 22 (Ct. App. 2002).

When a defendant seeks to

suppress evidence that is alleged to have been obtained as a result of an illegal seizure,
the defendant bears the burden of proving that a seizure occurred. State v. Page, 140
Idaho 841, 843 (2004).

"The test to determine if an individual is seized for Fourth
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Amendment purposes is an objective one," requiring an evaluation of "the totality of the
circumstances." State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658 (2007).
An encounter between a law enforcement officer and a citizen does not trigger
Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it is nonconsensual. State v. Baker, 141 Idaho 163,
165 (2004) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991 )). "A seizure under the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs only 'when the officer, by means of physical
force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen."' State v.

Nickel, 134 Idaho 610,612 (2000) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16 (1968)).
A seizure initiated through a show of authority requires words or actions, or both,
by a law enforcement officer that would convey to a reasonable person that the officer
was ordering him or her to restrict his or her movement. State v. Maland, 140 Idaho
817, 820 (2004) (citing California v. Hodari 0., 499 U.S. 621 (1991)). If a reasonable
person would feel free to disregard the law enforcement officer, then the encounter is
consensual. Page, 140 Idaho at 843.
In this case, the State conceded, and the district court held, that Mr. Gaytan was
seized the moment Sergeant Siems activated his overhead lights.
Mr. Gaytan agrees.

(R., p.86.)

Thus, the question for this Court is whether this seizure was

supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Mr. Gaytan was, or was about to
be, engaged in criminal activity. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 26. Whether reasonable and
articulable suspicion supports a Terry detention is an objective test that does not
depend upon the individual officer's subjective thought processes. Deen v. State, 131
Idaho 435, 436 (1998).
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The district court held that Sergeant Siems had reasonable, articulable suspicion
that Mr. Gaytan was violating I.C. §§ 18-4116, 20-549, and 18-6603. (R., pp.87-88.)
The court stated,
In this case, once Sergeant Siems' light illuminated the SUV parked in the
early morning hours, in an area known for criminal activity, and two (2)
individuals, male and female, obviously startled and alarmed, jumped up,
and he observed the male at least partially unclothed, below his shoulder,
he had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the parties were
engaging or were about to engage in criminal activity or that there was a
curfew violation.
(R., p.87.) Mr. Gaytan asserts that the information available to the officer at the time of
the seizure did not amount to reasonable suspicion that he was violating any of those
statutes.
Idaho Code§ 18-4116, Idaho's indecent exposure statute, provides,
Every person who willfully and lewdly, either:
(1) Exposes his or her genitals, in any public place, or in any place where
there is present another person or persons who are offended or
annoyed thereby; or,
(2) Procures, counsels, or assists any person so to expose his or her
genitals, where there is present another person or persons who are
offended or annoyed thereby is guilty of a misdemeanor.
I.C. § 18-4116. Regarding this statute, Sergeant Siems knew that Mr. Gaytan had no
clothes on his shoulder; he did not testify, and the court did not find, that he noticed
anything regarding the female's clothing. Further, Sergeant Siems had no knowledge of
whether any genitals were exposed. More importantly for purposes of this statute, the
interior of Mr. Gaytan's vehicle is not a public place, and there is nothing in the record to
support a finding that at the time of the seizure that either party was "offended or
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annoyed" by the display of genitals.

Therefore, the district court erred in holding that

Sergeant Siems possessed reasonable articulable suspicion of indecent exposure.
Idaho Code§ 20-549, a curfew statute, provides, in relevant part:
Violation by a juvenile offender of a curfew established by a municipal or
county ordinance shall be punishable by a fine not to exceed three
hundred dollars ($300), detention, or both. Fines shall be deposited in the
county juvenile justice fund of the county where the violation occurred, or if
such a fund has not been established, then in the current county expense
account for juvenile corrections purposes in the county where the violation
occurred. The imposition of detention shall be subject to the provisions of
sections 20-520(1 )( c) and 20-521, Idaho Code. Detention of a juvenile
offender in a county jail or detention center for violation of a curfew is
prohibited, unless the juvenile offender is an habitual status offender as
defined in section 20-521, Idaho Code.
I.C. § 20-549. Sergeant Siems did not possess reasonable articulable suspicion that
Mr. Gaytan was a juvenile and there is no evidence at all in the record that a curfew had
been established by either a municipal or county ordinance.
Sergeant Siems testified, and the district court found, that, prior to activating his
lights, he noted the passengers were a male with dark hair and a goatee and a female
with long dark hair.

(R., p.85.)

There was no testimony the officer noticed any

characteristics of the individuals that would indicate that they were juveniles, and the
fact that the male had a goatee would indicate that he was not a juvenile. Further, in
order to violate § 20-549, there must be a municipal or county ordinance that
establishes a curfew.

There was no testimony presented, and the court made no

factual findings, that any ordinance established a curfew. Therefore, the district court
erred in holding that Sergeant Siems possessed reasonable articulable suspicion of a
curfew violation.
Idaho Code§ 18-6603 provides,
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Any unmarried person who shall have sexual intercourse with an
unmarried person of the opposite sex shall be deemed guilty of
fornication, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not
more than $300 or by imprisonment for not more than six months or by
both such fine and imprisonment; provided, that the sentence imposed or
any part thereof may be suspended with or without probation in the
discretion of the court.
I.C. § 18-6603. Thus, to be prosecuted pursuant to this statute, an "unmarried person"
must engage in "sexual intercourse." Sergeant Siems did not have any evidence, prior

to activating his overhead lights, that the couple in the vehicle were unmarried. He also
had no evidence that they were having intercourse. Sergeant Siems knew that the male
had his shirt off and he had no evidence at all regarding the female.

Under these

particular circumstances, Mr. Gaytan asserts that Sergeant Siems lacked reasonable,
articulable suspicion that he was engaged in fornication. Thus, Mr. Gaytan asserts that
the district court erred by concluding that Sergeant Siems possessed reasonable,
articulable suspicion that he was violating any of the above statutes.
Finally, the district court found that Sergeant Siems testified before the grand jury
that he believed the park was a city park and therefore that it was illegal to be in the
park later than one-half hour after sunset. (R., p.88.) However, the court concluded
that the park was not a city park, but that Sergeant Siems made a "factual mistake."

(R, p.88.) However, the court concluded that the mistake was reasonable:
There is no evidence that Sergeant Siems knew this park was not a
community park at the time he initiated his investigation and, assuming it
is not a community park; this is the kind of mistake that a reasonable
person acting on the same facts would have concluded. As Sergeant
Siems testified to the Grand Jury, he would have had reason to believe
that the SUV was parked in violation of the Meridian ordinance, and that
its occupants were likewise violating that ordinance. Thus, he would have
had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that there was criminal activity.

(R, p.89.)
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The district court erred because there is absolutely no evidence in the record
indicating that the mistake was reasonable. In fact, there are no facts in the record at all
regarding the reason for the mistake.

For Fourth Amendment purposes, the

reasonableness of police conduct is judged against an objective standard. State v.
Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 291 (1995); State v. Foster, 127 Idaho 723,

(Ct. App.

1995). This standard allows room for some factual mistakes on the part of police
officers, Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed.
1879, 1891 (1949), but constitutional standards require that "the mistakes must be
those of reasonable men." Id. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, "If
subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment
would evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects,' only at the discretion of the police." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
There is nothing in the record to demonstrate that a reasonable person would
mistake the park in question for a "community park." The district court's conclusion in
this case was that "there is no evidence that Sergeant Siems knew this park was not a
community park at the time he initiated his investigation and, assuming it is not a
community park, this is the kind of mistake that a reasonable person acting on the same
facts would have concluded."

(R., p.89 (emphasis added.))

The fact that Sergeant

Siems may not have known that he was making a mistake does not mean that the
mistake was reasonable. The district court appears to have applied a subjective good
faith standard, when, as set forth above, mistakes must be "reasonable." And there is
nothing in the record indicating the reason for the mistake.
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The district court relied on Sergeant Siems' testimony before the grand jury, but
the only mention of anything related to a park ordinance was the statement, "we have a
city ordinance that says nobody can be in parks after dark."
Ls.24-25.)

There is nothing more.

(Grand Jury Tr., p.34,

At the suppression hearing, Sergeant Siems

conceded that the park in question was a homeowner's association park, not a Meridian
City park.

(Tr., p.35, Ls.17-20.)

There is no explanation for his mistake.

And as

Mr. Gaytan asserted in the reply memorandum in support of his motion to suppress, to
the extent that the State was asserting that Mr. Gaytan had violated Meridian City Code
13-2-6, that code provision required that the park be under the management and control
of the parks and recreation director. (R., p.72.)
In sum, there is nothing in the record indicating any evidence that would give a
reasonable person cause to believe mistakenly that the park in question was a
community park.

The district court's holding appears to be that such a mistake is

reasonable as a matter of law regardless of the facts. This is not the standard to be
applied. Therefore, the district court erred.
Mr. Gaytan sought exclusion of a// evidence obtained subsequent to the illegal
seizure.

(R., p. 71.)

Once it has been determined that there is a constitutionally

prohibited seizure, evidence or information acquired as a result of the seizure will be
excluded unless the causal connection between the seizure and the acquisition has
been broken See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). In this case, all of
the evidence obtained against Mr. Gaytan stemmed from the illegal seizure. Mr. Gaytan
thus asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress. The seizure
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was illegal because it was not supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion that
Mr. Gaytan had been, or was about to be, engaged in criminal activity.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Gaytan respectfully requests that the district court's ordering denying his
motion to suppress be reversed, that his conviction be vacated, and that his case be
remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this yth day of January, 2013.

JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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